THE IMPACT OF ENFORCEMENT: A REFLECTION
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†

In response to John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of
Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007).
Professor John Coffee is one of the most insightful and imaginative scholars of modern corporate finance, and I am delighted that he
has turned his fertile mind to the study of enforcement in securities
regulation. On the view that extension is the sincerest form of flattery, I am especially pleased to see that Professor Coffee has found my
own earlier work on regulatory intensity as a useful starting point for
1
aspects of his analysis.
When I first identified the striking differences in regulatory intensity across jurisdictions, I had hoped that others would do just what
Professor Coffee has attempted in his article: refine my preliminary
data and develop a better theoretical understanding of the significance of variations of regulatory intensity for the quality of financial
2
markets. Professor Coffee has made progress on both fronts. His article introduces new data on formal enforcement actions and budgets
3
in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia —and makes a compelling argument that the high level of enforcement activity in the
United States explains, in part, why foreign issuers have been attracted
to U.S. public capital markets in recent years and why some classes of
4
foreign issuers still are. This second point has important policy im-
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James S. Reid, Jr., Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful for Mark
Roe’s helpful suggestions on this Response.
1
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 229, 258 (2007).
2
See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 271-80 (2007) (presenting
cross-jurisdictional data). In a similar spirit, my colleague Mark Roe and I have produced an empirical study showing the positive impact of real resources committed to
public enforcement on robust capital markets. See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe,
Private and Public Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (Feb. 22,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003177.
3
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 276-83.
4
See id. at 235-36 (explaining the “bonding hypothesis,” which says that “by subjecting themselves to the SEC’s higher disclosure standards and the greater prospect of
enforcement in the United States, foreign firms reduce their agency costs”).
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plications for the ongoing debate over the competitiveness of U.S. financial regulation, as it suggests that a relaxation of U.S. regulatory
standards and a retreat from the SEC’s traditional emphasis on enforcement may in the long run actually reduce this country’s ability to
5
compete for foreign listings and capital market dominance. The
uniqueness of U.S. enforcement efforts that Professor Coffee identifies also raises potentially serious questions about the wisdom of recent proposals to accept foreign regulatory regimes as systems of substitute compliance for U.S. oversight of foreign exchanges and
6
securities firms.
In a post-legal-realist world, the proposition that the law on the
books does not fully capture the significance of legal regimes is uncontroversial. The frequency with which laws are enforced and the
consequences of successful enforcement actions quite plausibly have
real economic consequences. Thus, one might readily expect that financial markets with stronger mechanisms for enforcing legal requirements will behave differently than those financial markets in
similar jurisdictions with identical legal requirements and less enforcement. Hence, the core of Professor Coffee’s thesis—that higher
levels of enforcement in the United States benefit U.S. financial markets—seems eminently reasonable. But to validate this claim, one
needs to devise an objective measure of enforcement efforts, and then
(ideally) to undertake empirical tests of the relationship between that
measure of enforcement and other measures of financial market performance in a number of different settings.
In this Response, I will touch briefly upon the not inconsiderable
challenges confronting researchers seeking to confirm or rebut the
claims that Professor Coffee advances. There are substantial complexities involved in comparing levels of international regulatory intensity. Moreover, the globalization of financial markets and the increasing collaboration among regulatory bodies makes it even more
difficult to structure clean tests of the impact of the supervisory efforts
of individual countries. While there are alternative mechanisms

5

Cf. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 71-91 (2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/
11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (arguing that the high level of regulatory
intensity in the United States disadvantages U.S. markets).
6
See Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J.
105 (2007) (discussing the proposals of Ethiopis Tafara and Robert J. Peterson in their
article, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework,
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007)).
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whereby one could evaluate the efficacy of regulatory oversight, it is
not clear which approach will generate the most meaningful results in
validating Professor Coffee’s hypotheses that U.S. public enforcement
provides a unique benefit to American markets and that lesser degrees
of enforcement activity in other jurisdictions mean that their supervisory approaches should not be considered acceptable substitutes for
U.S. oversight.
I. CHALLENGES IN DEVISING OBJECTIVE MEASURES
OF REGULATORY INTENSITY
The two basic approaches that Professor Coffee and I have utilized
to measure the regulatory intensity of supervisory regimes are regulatory inputs, such as staffing or budgets, and regulatory outputs, such
as enforcement actions or monetary sanctions. As Mark Roe and I
7
have discussed elsewhere, each of these approaches has its advantages, but both are also susceptible to a number of criticisms, which
could be categorized as incompleteness, misdirection, and inadequate
granularity.
A. Incompleteness
No matter how one attempts to measure regulatory intensity
across jurisdictions, there is always a concern that one has failed to
identify all relevant regulatory inputs. This problem is most apparent
for staffing and budget measures, with the United Kingdom offering a
good example. While the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) is
perhaps the premier example of a consolidated supervisory agency,
the British actually maintain several other regulatory bodies that fulfill
functions comparable to those of the U.S. SEC. The British Financial
Reporting Council employs a staff of fifty-five with a budget of £14.5
million, polices auditing firms and the accounting statements of corporate issuers, and undertakes activities comparable to those of the
SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance and the Public Company Ac8
counting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The Panel on Takeovers and

7

See generally Jackson & Roe, supra note 2 (comparing the merits of public and
private securities regulation). Another complexity not discussed in this Response is
the need to make adjustments to account for economies of scale that likely occur in
financial regulation based on market size and perhaps also the size and number of
regulated firms.
8
See Devon Kirk & Tonbofa Ashimi, An Overview of Securities Enforcement in the
United Kingdom 16-18, 22-23 (Nov. 20, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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Mergers also plays an important role, somewhat comparable to the
9
SEC’s with respect to proxy fights and tender offers. Regulatory
comparisons that rely solely on FSA staffing or budget levels miss these
other important regulatory components.
The supervisory functions of stock exchanges also complicate
comparative head counts. In the United States, the supervisory activities of the NYSE and NASD have, for a number of years, been isolated
in separate operational units, and are now fully removed into the Fi10
nancial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Around the world,
the supervisory roles of exchanges have diminished with the demutualization of all major exchanges and the dictates of EU listing direc11
tives. However, regulatory functions do still take place in many exchanges, especially with respect to the review of new listing
applications, where exchange personnel often take on roles similar to,
though invariably less intensive than, those of SEC staffers who review
registration statements for IPOs. The Hong Kong stock exchange’s
12
oversight of new listings would be a good example of this role.
Finally, there is variation in the reliance that different regulators
make of private assistance. Within the German civil law tradition, this
reliance seems particularly striking. As Professor Coffee notes, Germany’s BaFin makes use of outside audits to supplement regulatory
13
oversight. The Swiss Federal Banking Commission makes even more
extensive use of outside auditors, requiring them to undertake annual
supplemental (and confidential) reports with respect to regulatory
14
compliance. These reports are comparable to what the SEC’s Office
of Compliance Inspections and Examinations might produce, but the
Swiss personnel who undertake these reviews do not show up on government payrolls.
Similar problems of completeness exist in collecting comprehensive data on enforcement outputs. For example, in evaluating enforcement efforts in the United Kingdom, one would want to consider

9

Id. at 13-15.
Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1239, 1330-31 (2007).
11
See id. at 1244-45 (discussing the impact of demutualization on regulator decision making).
12
See id. at 1284 tbl.6, 1286 (detailing Hong Kong’s regulatory framework).
13
Coffee, supra note 1, at 280-81.
14
See Sweethaa Ballakrishnen et al., An Overview of Securities Enforcement in
Switzerland 7 (Nov. 21, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing the role of authorized outside auditors in the Swiss system).
10
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both the oversight functions of the Financial Reporting Council mentioned above and also the Financial Ombudsman Service, which pro15
vides mediation services for a large number of matters each year, but
whose enforcement actions are not included in the data reported in
Professor Coffee’s article. One should also probably take into account
the predilection of some regulatory bodies to resolve enforcement actions informally and without public disclosure. Again, this is a common practice for the British FSA, but it is also employed by many
other jurisdictions, including, for example, Switzerland, where many
16
enforcement actions are reported only on an anonymous basis.
B. Misdirection
By misdirection, I mean the possibility that both publicly reported
regulatory resources and enforcement outputs may not actually be intended to produce supervisory services. To begin with, there is an obvious question of whether all resources allocated to regulatory agencies are in fact employed in bona fide supervisory functions, as
opposed to serving as sinecures for cronies of political elites or posi17
tions from which to extract bribes and other economic rents. While
all of the major financial centers of the world—the United States, the
United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Amsterdam—do report above-average levels of regulatory staffing and budgets, one can also find some more surprising jurisdictions (like Nigeria
and Jordan) that report devoting substantial resources to regulatory
agencies. The possibility of graft and sinecures may produce nontrivial levels of “noise” in measures of regulatory input, especially for
samples that include the developing world.
One might also imagine similar misdirection in reported enforcement activities, if, for example, financial sanctions were being
imposed to penalize political opponents of the parties in power, or to
punish industry participants for failing to pay bribes to regulatory officials. While this may seem to be the kind of problem one would encounter in seriously corrupt jurisdictions, there is a possibility that the
problem is more widespread. In the United States, for example, the
monetary penalties imposed earlier this decade by state authorities,
led by former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, materially in15

Kirk & Ashimi, supra note 8, at 20, 31.
See Ballakrishnen et al., supra note 14, at 17-18.
17
See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND: GOVERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES 81-108 (1998) (examining the destructive
impact of rent-seeking and corruption).
16
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creased the level of overall U.S. monetary sanctions. The most uncharitable critics of Mr. Spitzer claimed that these actions were pri19
marily designed to advance his own political ambitions; if true, the
inclusion of these actions in aggregate U.S. data could confound
analysis that proceeds on the assumption that all monetary sanctions
are imposed to deter wrongful market behavior.
C. Inadequate Granularity
One of the virtues of Professor Coffee’s analysis is that it attempts
to provide greater granularity to the subject of regulatory inputs by
examining the portion of regulatory staffs dedicated to enforcement
20
activity. Extending his analysis, one could imagine decomposing the
allocation of staffs into supervisory building blocks of rule formulation, examination and inspection, enforcement, and other sectors.
While one would face considerable challenges in assembling such
data—currently regulatory agencies are remarkably eclectic in job
classifications, and the lines between examination and enforcement
often blur—the development of more refined staffing data would be
of considerable interest. One might, however, imagine other ways in
which to subdivide regulatory personnel to generate equally interesting granularity. The professional backgrounds of regulatory personnel vary substantially across jurisdictions. The SEC hires many lawyers
and accountants; in contrast, the British FSA employs more economists and high-level staff drawn from industry ranks. There are also
differences in the extent to which regulatory personnel move back
and forth between industry and government, as opposed to staying
largely within a civil service path. In addition, the degree to which
regulatory personnel turns over with changes in political leadership
also varies a good deal across jurisdictions. It is not entirely clear
which staffing divisions are most closely tied to strong financial mar18

See Jackson, supra note 2, at 280 tbl.3 (showing that monetary sanctions by state
agencies between 2002 and 2004 accounted for slightly more than one-fifth of the total
amount of public sanctions imposed in the United States).
19
See, e.g., Posting of William J. Holstein to The Corner Office, Eliot Spitzer’s Legacy on Trial, http://blogs.bnet.com/ceo/?p=1081 (Jan. 7, 2008, 06:31) (“[I]t was obvious [Spitzer] was using his powers as attorney general to win the gubernatorial race
in New York . . . .”). Note, however, that Mr. Spitzer’s enforcement actions might still
have had positive deterrent effects on financial misbehavior, even if the actions were
partially motivated by personal advancement.
20
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 272-73 (noting that despite similarities in staffing and budgetary levels among the major regulators in Canada, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, “the United States punishes more severely”).
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kets, but to the extent that staffing allocations are significant—an assumption of Professor Coffee’s discussion of enforcement staffing levels in the United States and Australia—then one might want to examine the relationship on multiple dimensions.
Similar distinctions could also be made with respect to enforcement actions and penalties. In most jurisdictions, regulatory officials
have jurisdiction over a wide range of activities—including the quality
of corporate disclosures, insider trading and market manipulation,
the sales practices of securities firms, and a host of technical rules regarding financial institutions’ solvency and the technical operation of
markets. The distribution of enforcement efforts varies a good deal
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with the SEC placing more emphasis
on the review of disclosure documents and enforcement actions
21
against other issuers than do other jurisdictions. And, of course, the
incidence and distribution of private enforcement actions against
both issuers and securities firms varies from country to country. Aggregate data about overall enforcement actions and sanctions may obscure important differences across enforcement categories.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE MECHANISMS OF ENFORCEMENT
Even assuming one could assemble data, with an appropriate degree of granularity, about the real resources allocated to legitimate
public oversight of financial markets and the associated measures of
formal enforcement actions, one might still be a long way from divining whether a particular jurisdiction’s level of regulatory intensity ensures an adequate level of compliance or sufficient oversight to foster
robust capital markets. The linkage between regulatory intensity and
positive economic outputs is not well understood and may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Consider, for example, the possibility that the regulated entities in
one jurisdiction—think Sweden—are more apt to comply with newly
promulgated legal rules than their counterparts in other jurisdic22
tions—say Italy. This commonly accepted stereotype of the North-

21

See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Regulatory Intensity in the Regulation of Capital Markets:
A Preliminary Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Approaches, in THE TASK FORCE TO MODERNIZE SECURITIES LEGISLATION IN CANADA, CANADA STEPS UP: RESEARCH STUDIES:
STRENGTHENING MARKET CREDIBILITY AND INTEGRITY 118-19, 120 fig.5 (2006), available
at http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V6(2)%20Jackson.pdf (providing data showing that the
SEC puts forth great effort to prosecute issuer-related violations).
22
See Jackson, supra note 2, at 265 (“Some jurisdictions may be populated with
scofflaws, prone to abusive practices and needing intensive and continuous oversight.
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South European divide would imply that fewer enforcement actions
are necessary in some jurisdictions than in others in order to generate
the same impact on private market behavior. One does not, however,
need to posit transjurisdictional variation in inherent lawfulness in
order to have concerns about the comparability of enforcement efforts from one country to the next. The means by which regulators
enforce legal requirements may well differ materially around the
world. The light-touch regulation of the British FSA includes numerous mechanisms of public-private exchange, ranging from the raised
eyebrow on official Albion foreheads to the quite complex network of
advisory committees and consultations that characterize British supervisory practices. Somewhat similar in effect is the use of informal
guidance in Japan. All of these alternative mechanisms of social control are plausible substitutes for the formal enforcement actions that
characterize the regulatory activity in the United States and a few
other jurisdictions. The relative scarcity of enforcement actions in
these other jurisdictions does not necessarily imply greater noncompliance or economic drag.
It is also important to examine the relationship between public
enforcement efforts and private sanctions. As Professor Coffee notes,
private litigation in the United States often follows on the heels of
23
public sanctions. And thus the significance of public enforcement
efforts in the United States, as compared with the United Kingdom or
Germany, may be even greater than the raw numbers suggest. However, litigation may not be the only, or even the most, important private response to public enforcement actions: market movements in
the form of price declines for shares and career consequences for im24
plicated individuals may be far greater. Plus, to the extent that viola-

Other populations may be more lawful . . . and hence less in need of supervisory oversight.”).
23
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 275 (describing the “tendency for public and private
penalties to be imposed on a cumulative and overlapping basis”); see also James D. Cox
et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 763 (2003)
(finding that the defendants in 37 of 248 securities class actions had also been sued by
the SEC).
24
See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=652121 (stating that the largest monetary penalties for misconduct are imposed by the market, not regulators or the courts); Jonathan M. Karpoff
et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation 1-3 (Apr. 16,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=972607 (asserting that shareholders sustain losses and culpable managers lose their jobs when companies are accused of misconduct).
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tors are public firms, the proxy process and voting power may impose
additional sanctions on management. At this stage, most of the work
done on market reactions to public enforcement efforts has focused
on U.S. markets; thus we do not know whether foreign markets impose similar knock-on sanctions. It is, however, conceivable that in
some foreign jurisdictions private monitors do a better job of amplifying public sanctions than do U.S. markets. In London, for example,
shareholders are said to have more power in the boardroom and so
British investors may respond to FSA sanctions more effectively than
their U.S. counterparts respond to SEC sanctions.
III. GLOBALIZATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Globalization also complicates comparative evaluations of enforcement data on many dimensions. Cross-listed firms are one case
in point. If one considers the number of enforcement actions in Canada and adjusts for the relative size of the Canadian market, one
would likely conclude that the level of securities enforcement in Canada is substantially lower than in the United States. However, it turns
out that quite a large number of leading Canadian firms are crosslisted in the United States, and therefore are also subject to many U.S.
regulatory requirements, supervisory standards (including exchange
oversight), and even private liability rules. Accordingly, the Canadian
system of securities oversight does not constitute the entire universe of
legal constraints on a major portion of the Canadian stock market.
To some degree, Canadian securities markets free-ride off of U.S.
25
regulatory intensity.
The increasing collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries
complicates our evaluation of national regulatory efforts in other ways
as well. With the globalization of financial markets, regulatory officials routinely refer matters to their counterparts in other jurisdictions. Often, a problem like insider trading or market manipulation
will be detected in one market but will be referred to a second or
third jurisdiction, where the investor making the trades or the firm in
whose stock the trade is affected is located. Referrals of this sort happen hundreds and perhaps even thousands of times each year, and

25

See Jackson, supra note 21, at 97. Alternatively, when one normalizes the
amount of regulatory activity in Canada, one could reduce the market capitalization of
Canadian domestic firms to account for the fact that the United States oversees some
portion of that market capitalization. Of course, one should then adjust upward the
level of market capitalization of U.S. markets, at least for determining the effective
level of U.S. market oversight. Id.
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greatly expand the investigatory powers and enforcement reach of national regulatory authorities. For many jurisdictions, these cooperative arrangements may substantially enhance their regulatory capacity
beyond those suggested by the countries’ own supervisory forces.
A similar point can be made about the development of new regulatory policies and legal standards. In the past, such activities were
largely conducted independently at the national level, with relatively
little cross-border collaboration. In recent times, however, a relatively
small number of jurisdictions—the United States and the United
Kingdom being the most prominent examples—have dedicated substantial resources to policy analysis and the development of new rules
for emerging issues such as hedge funds and derivatives transactions,
and then have shared their conclusions with other jurisdictions (often
with the assistance of multilateral bodies, such as the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) or the Basel Committee, or regional treaty arrangements, such as the European Union). As a result, smaller countries—even those with quite substantial
financial markets—benefit from policy and rule development occurring beyond their borders. Analyses that focus solely on local resources miss this important regulatory networking.
IV. HOW ELSE MIGHT WE MEASURE THE ADEQUACY OF REGULATORY
INTENSITY?
Let us now return to the key policy issues that Professor Coffee
raised in his article. How might we go about determining whether the
United States or some other jurisdiction was devoting adequate resources to supervising and policing financial markets? While comparisons of regulatory staffing and budgets, or overviews of enforcement intensity, may help identify instances where a country differs
dramatically from international standards—as does the United States
in the case of securities class action suits—these measures of regulatory inputs and outputs are likely to be too crude to make sharp distinctions across a wide range of jurisdictions, even if one could establish—as Mark Roe and I have attempted—that the allocation of
greater resources to public enforcement is generally associated with
26
more robust capital markets. What other measures of quality exist?
In my view, there are two plausible, alternative approaches.

26

See Jackson & Roe, supra note 2.
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The first would focus on technical measures of financial performance. With respect to corporate issuers, one might consider the cost
of capital across jurisdictions on the assumption that if domestic firms
within a jurisdiction can raise capital at reasonable prices, that jurisdiction must have a reasonably acceptable legal system to oversee the
issuance of securities, or, at least, local markets must have developed
adequate mechanisms to police serious agency costs by corporate insiders or controlling shareholders. In a similar spirit, one could look
to the behavior of trading markets—bid-ask spreads, price synchronicity, and evidence of trading on inside information—to draw infer27
ences about regulatory quality. The evidence of equity premiums for
cross-listed firms discussed in Professor Coffee’s article has similar
28
probative value, but is potentially available for only a limited number
of jurisdictions—the United States, the United Kingdom, and perhaps
Hong Kong or Luxembourg—which attract substantial numbers of
cross-listings. The vast majority of national stock markets do not compete for foreign listings, and are quite happy if they can simply retain
their domestic firms.
Another metric for evaluating financial markets can be found by
examining the behavior of market participants. This kind of evidence
is often cited in the unfolding debate over U.S. capital market competitiveness. The declining number of new foreign listings and the
spike of foreign firm deregistrations in the latter half of 2007 have
been seen as evidence that American regulation has become too on29
erous. Conversely, one could see evidence of a rising number of new
foreign listings as a measure of the quality of those markets that actively compete for foreign listings. More widely applicable would be a
market test based on the increasing presence in foreign markets of institutional investors (as well as retail investors) from the United States
and other developed nations. When sophisticated institutional investors make substantial investments in a country’s financial markets and
depend on that market’s trading systems and support mechanisms,
27

Some different technical measures would be necessary to assess the quality of
broker-dealer interactions with their customers as well as that of asset managers, such
as mutual funds. One could, however, examine the costs of such intermediation services and their impact on portfolio returns to draw inferences about the efficacy of
regulatory controls.
28
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 235-36 (noting that equity premiums for cross-listed
firms occur only in the United States, which Professor Coffee attributes to the benefits
of intense U.S. enforcement activity).
29
See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE
U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET 3 (2007), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/
The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf.
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such as custodial services and clearing arrangements, that confidence
represents another source of market-based information on the quality
of foreign markets and may well have some probative value in corroborating the quality of local regulation and legal regimes.
CONCLUSION
So what is to be done if we wish to gain better insight into the relative quality of regulatory systems? The short answer, I think, is that no
single approach will suffice. Analysis of regulatory intensity—both in
terms of regulatory inputs and outputs along the lines that Professor
Coffee and I have both attempted—has undoubted value. But one
must be careful to draw the comparisons accurately with considerable
attention to institutional variation across jurisdictions. Confident
normative judgments about the implications of observed variations in
regulatory intensity should await empirical validation. One should
also consider evidence available from objective measures of quality
that are more directly tied to financial performance, as well as the additional information one can derive from observing how market participants, both corporate issuers and sophisticated institutional investors, vote with their feet and their dollars.
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